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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case under Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j). The Supreme Court is authorized to transfer this appeal to the Court of 
Appeals under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4). The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction 
over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendants and appellees Brown disagree with the statement of issues relating to 
Browns that is contained in the Brief of Appellants.1 
1. Whether Sanders, who owns no real estate in Draper City or in the vicinity of 
the subject property, has standing to assert any claim in this action. The district court found 
at trial that Sanders owned no interest and was estopped to assert any interest in the property 
adjacent to the Brown Parcel [R. 901, 908] and Sanders does not appeal from that deter-
mination. The issue whether one not having any interest in real property in the vicinity of 
the Brown Parcel can assert a private nuisance claim, assert a trespass claim, or challenge a 
subdivision of the Brown Parcel is a question of law and is therefore reviewable for correct-
ness. Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996). 
2. Whether the district court's Partial Summary Judgment dismissing Fifth 
[negligence], Sixth [illegal subdivision], and Seventh [private nuisance] Causes of Action of 
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint against Browns can be sustained on any of the following 
grounds: 
(a) Sanders' counsel during oral argument agreed that the negligence claim, 
Fifth Cause of Action, should be dismissed. [R. 962.] 
The issues relating to Browns are contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Appellants' Brief at pages 1-2. 
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(b) The statute of limitations bars plaintiffs' challenge to Draper City's 
variance. This issue presents a question of law and is therefore reviewable for 
correctness. Carlie v. Morgan. 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996). This issue was one of the 
grounds for the district court's Partial Summary Judgment in favor of Browns. [R. 
310-11, 971-72.] 
(c) Plaintiffs cannot, as a matter of law, maintain a private action chal-
lenging the sale of a subdivision lot under zoning and planning laws. This issue 
presents a question of law and is therefore reviewable for correctness. Id. This issue 
was one of the grounds for the district court's Partial Summary Judgment in favor of 
Browns. [R. 310-11, 972-73.] 
(d) Glanville, as owner of the only affected property, did not complain 
concerning any violations of the subdivision laws. The court found that Glanville had 
no complaint with Browns and Glanville admitted that Browns never did anything 
about which he was complaining. [R. 902, 905, 908.] The district court so found at 
trial, and Sanders does not challenge that finding on appeal. Whether a claim can be 
stated by one who has no complaint concerning the conduct at issue is a question of 
law reviewable for correctness. Id. 
(e) Plaintiffs suffered no injury flowing from the conduct of Browns with 
respect to the subdivision of the subject property. This issue presents a question of 
law and is therefore reviewable for correctness. Id. This ground was a basis for the 
district court's Partial Summary Judgment in favor of Browns. [R. 199-201, 310-11.] 
3. Whether the district court erred in holding that plaintiff Sanders is liable to 
Browns in the amount of the attorney's fees incurred by Browns in preparing for and attend-
ing trial and in any post-trial proceedings in this action under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56. 
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The issue whether plaintiffs' claims were "without merit" is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness; the issue whether Sanders pursued his claims in "bad faith" is a question of fact 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah App. 
1991). This issue was preserved for appeal in the evidence and argument presented at trial. 
[R. 277-292.] 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-15 (1953): 
The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of 
adjustment may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any 
court of competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is presented 
to the court within thirty days after filing of such decision in the office of the 
board. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-38-1 (1953): 
Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent, or offensive to the 
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the 
comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance and the subject of an 
action. Such action may be brought by any person whose property is injur-
iously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by [the] nuisance; 
and by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or abated, and damages 
may also be recovered. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees 
to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except 
under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees 
against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in 
the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding 
fees under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff Sanders owned three contiguous parcels of land in Draper City, Utah. 
Sanders did not pay his mortgage payments, and his lender, Mountainwest Savings and Loan, 
foreclosed a deed of trust covering only one of those three parcels. Browns ultimately 
purchased that parcel from Mountainwest. To insulate his remaining property from his 
creditors, Sanders conveyed his other two parcels to his brother-in-law, Glanville. Instead of 
challenging Mountainwest's foreclosure, Sanders and Glanville sued Draper City, Browns, 
and another of Sanders' neighbors, Stevenses (but not the foreclosing lender), alleging 
violations of the subdivision laws, negligence, illegality, private nuisance, and trespass. 
Draper City, Browns, and Stevenses had nothing to do with the foreclosure that caused 
Sanders his damage — it was self-inflicted. 
Disposition Below 
Early on, the court granted Draper City's motion to dismiss all claims against Draper 
City and its representatives. [R. 97-99.] The court thereafter granted two successive 
motions for summary judgment by Browns, which terminated all claims of plaintiffs against 
Browns other than a part of Sanders' trespass claims. [R. 310-12, 606-14.] Following a 
bench trial, the court dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs' remaining trespass claims against 
Browns and determined that this action was without merit, was not brought or asserted in 
good faith, and that Sanders was liable to Browns for their attorney's fees at trial and in any 
post-trial proceedings under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56. [R. 894-911.] This appeal 
followed. 
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Statement of Facts 
The statement of facts contained in the Brief of Appellants generally contains Sanders' 
version of things, which was rejected by the trial court, and ignores the mountain of evidence 
in opposition to the position of Sanders. Browns therefore advance their own statement of 
facts. 
This action concerns several parcels of property and a right-of-way serving them. 
Following is a graphic depiction of the land in question [R. 369]: 
Panhandle 
Parcel 
Right-of-Way 
Parcel 
Claimed gap between 
Right-of-Way and 
Brown Parcel 
A 
13800 South Street 
For convenience, each parcel identified above will hereinafter be referred to by the names 
noted above. 
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Sanders' Acquisition of the Property. Between 1979 and 1981, Ovards acquired all 
of the Brown Parcel, the Glanville Parcel, and the Panhandle Parcel, together with a right-of-
way over the Right-of-Way Parcel. [Ex. 8 ff 16-18.] Ovards transferred to Nipkos fee title 
to the Brown Parcel and a right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel in December 1980. 
[Ex. 8 1ffi 19, 20.] Nipkos concurrently gave Mountainwest Savings and Loan a trust deed 
covering only the Brown Parcel and a right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel. [Ex. 8 
f1fl9, 20.] Nipkos later conveyed the Brown Parcel and a right-of-way over the Right-of-
Way Parcel to Sanders by Uniform Real Estate Contract dated July 28, 1982. [Ex. 8 121.] 
Sanders assumed the Mountainwest trust deed at the time of his purchase. [R. 1082.] At a 
later date, in November 1982, Sanders acquired from Ovards the Glanville Parcel and the 
Panhandle Parcel. [Ex. 8 1[24.] Thus, for some period of time, Sanders owned the Brown 
Parcel and right-of-way but did not own the adjacent Panhandle Parcel and Glanville Parcel. 
The Mountainwest Foreclosure, the Variance, and Browns' Purchase. In 1987, 
Sanders moved away from his house on the Brown Parcel and ceased making payments to 
Mountainwest. [R. 1034, 1082.] Sanders ceased making the mortgage payments because he 
"went someplace else and . . . couldn't afford to make double payments." [R. 1085.] 
Mountainwest therefore initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure. After the foreclosure was 
initiated, but before it was completed, Mountainwest sought and obtained from Draper City a 
variance allowing the Brown Parcel to be separately occupied. [Ex. 4.] Sanders personally 
appeared at the variance hearing and opposed the granting of the variance. [R. 1238.] 
Sanders made no effort to appeal that variance, which validated the subdivision of the Brown 
Parcel. Mountainwest completed its foreclosure and received a trustee's deed covering the 
Brown Parcel and a right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel, which was recorded on 
September 1, 1988. [Ex. 8 1(22.] Months after the foreclosure sale, Mountainwest in 
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January 1989 sold and conveyed the Brown Parcel and a right-of-way over the Right-of-Way 
Parcel to Browns. [Ex. 8 f23.] 
Sanders' Phony Conveyance to Glanville. Sanders was concurrently being sued by 
Ovard (his seller on the Glanville and Panhandle Parcels) and being foreclosed upon by his 
lender on the Brown Parcel, Mountainwest. In that context, Sanders transferred the 
Glanville Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel to his sister and brother-in-law, M.D. and B.N. 
Glanville, by "Grant Deeds" dated May 19, 1988. Sanders made those transfers shortly 
before and with actual knowledge of the imminent entry of judgment against Sanders and in 
favor of Ovard for the balance of Sanders' purchase money and one week before the initially 
scheduled date for foreclosure of the Mountainwest trust deed on the Brown Parcel.2 [R. 
1085-89.] Glanville gave no real consideration for the transfer. Glanville claimed Sanders 
gave him a ten dollar bill, but Sanders denied paying even that nominal amount. [R. 1355, 
1471.] Sanders admitted that he conveyed the Glanville Parcel and Panhandle Parcel to his 
relatives "to protect that property from foreclosure risks." [R. 1089-90.] The court found 
that Sanders transferred those properties to Glanville to place them beyond the reach of his 
creditors. [R. 901.] 
The district court found that Sanders thereafter owned no interest in the Glanville 
Parcel or the Panhandle Parcel and that, by conveying those parcels to Glanville to place 
them beyond the reach of his creditors, Sanders was estopped to assert that he had any 
ownership of that property in this action. [R. 901, 908.] Sanders' position on the ownership 
of the Glanville Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel (which would have granted standing to sue 
Browns for trespass) was irreconcilably inconsistent: First, in answers to interrogatories 
2
 The Mountainwest foreclosure was rescheduled and actually occurred months later in September 
1988. [Ex. 8, Tab K.] 
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prepared after consulting with his counsel, Sanders stated under oaih that GlanviUe owned 
fee simple title to the GlanviUe Parcel and, although asked, Sanders did not identify himself 
as a holder of any encumbrance, lien or other interest in the GlanviUe Parcel. [R. 1091-92.] 
GlanviUe testified in his deposition that Sanders transferred the property to him to "protect 
his [Sanders'] interest." GlanviUe assumed that Sanders' creditors were nosing around for 
assets, and probably Sanders was protecting the property from his creditors. [R. 1356-57.] 
GlanviUe also testified that Sanders sold the property to him and that "right now he [Sanders] 
doesn't own any interest in the property. His [Sanders'] interest is whatever I say it is." 
GlanviUe testified that when the property is sold, Sanders would only receive "what I 
[GlanviUe] say he'll get." [R. 1352, 1356-58.] Second, inconsistently with his claimed 
ownership of those parcels, Sanders attempted to acquire the rights of GlanviUe through an 
"Assignment" that was first made known to Browns by serving a copy of it upon their 
counsel by mail on July 10, 1995 - just three days before trial in this six year old case 
commenced. [Ex. 1; R. 895-97.] The court on multiple grounds rejected the admissibility 
of the Assignment. Third, at trial, and wholly inconsistently with his prior testimony and 
actions, Sanders asserted that he owned an equitable interest in the property. [R. 1037.] 
The Right-of-Way Location. Sanders claimed that Browns trespassed on the 
Panhandle Parcel because there was a few foot gap between the Right-of-Way Parcel and the 
Brown Parcel. The right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel was and is the only access to 
the Brown Parcel. [Ex. 8 127.] The Right-of-Way Parcel was described in numerous trans-
fers of the Brown Parcel. [Ex. 8 1111-25.] Although the metes and bounds description of 
the Right-of-Way Parcel literally described a parcel with a small gap between it and the 
Brown Parcel (to which it was intended to furnish access), many of those transfers also 
described that metes and bounds description of the Right-of-Way Parcel as "connecting [the 
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Brown Parcel] to 13800 South Sireet" and "adjacent to and parallel with the west line of the 
[Brown Parcel]. . . . " [Ex. 8, Tabs G-L, N.] Contrary to their claims in this action, both 
Sanders and Glanville testified in their depositions that they understood that the Right-of-Way 
Parcel was adjacent to and connected to the Brown Parcel. [R. 1374-77, 1441-43.] The trial 
court ruled on summary judgment, based independently on the three grounds of deed con-
struction, easement by necessity, and reformation, that the Right-of-Way Parcel was in fact 
adjacent to and connected with the Brown Parcel. [R. 606-13.] 
The Death of Glanville. The court by notice served March 15, 1995 scheduled the 
trial of this action to commence on July 13, 1995. [R. 764.] B.N. Glanville died in May 
1995. [R. 895.] Sanders' counsel served a Suggestion of Death concerning B.N. Glanville 
in this action on June 13, 1995. About a month later, Sanders on July 10, 1995 (three days 
before trial) by mail served a "Designation of Additional Exhibit" — an "Assignment of 
Claim" purporting to assign Glanville's claims back to Sanders. [R. 768.] The court ruled 
the Assignment inadmissible for a host of reasons. [R. 895-97.] Sanders never filed a 
motion for substitution of the personal representative of B.N. Glanville or other proper party 
as required by Rule 25, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R. 895-96.] 
Sanders' Frivolous Claims in this Action. Sanders' dealings with Browns followed 
Sanders' being foreclosed out of the Brown Parcel and Sanders' fraudulent conveyance of his 
adjoining land to his relatives. With no prior communication to Browns whatsoever, Sanders 
caused his then-attorney, Frederick Green, to direct correspondence to Browns in March 
1990, demanding that Browns cease trespassing over the gap between the right-of-way and 
the Brown Parcel and that Browns remove their horses from the Glanville Parcel. [Ex. 3; R. 
1096-97.] Within one or two days, Browns removed their horses from the Glanville Parcel. 
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[R. 1097, 1173.] Sanders nevertheless filed this action against Browns on April 23, 1990. 
[R. 01.] 
Sanders asserted two groups of claims against Browns: First, Sanders alleged that 
Browns negligently acquired the Brown Parcel and that their ownership and occupation of 
that property (in which Sanders concededly had no interest) allegedly violated subdivision 
laws and therefore constituted a "private nuisance" and illegal ownership. [R. 157-58.] 
Sanders advanced these arguments in support of his obviously frivolous claims: He claimed 
that Browns' purchase of the property from Mountainwest (Sanders' foreclosing lender) 
violated his rights. He asserted that Mountainwest's sale of the property to Browns (a 
transaction to which he was not a party) was illegal and should be rescinded. He asserted 
that the Browns' occupation of the same property that he, himself, had previously occupied 
constituted a "private nuisance." [R. 157-58.] Those frivolous claims were resolved by 
Browns' first motion for summary judgment. That left only Sanders' trespass claims for 
resolution. 
Sanders asserted two kinds of trespass claims. Sanders' first trespass claim was that, 
in passing from the house and garage on the Brown Parcel to the literal metes and bounds 
description of the Right-of-Way Parcel, Browns were passing over and trespassing upon the 
Glanville Parcel because there was a small gap between the Right-of-Way Parcel and the 
Brown Parcel. [R. 155.] Sanders' position was both ridiculous and inconsistent with his 
own conduct. In addition to the undisputed facts that the Right-of-Way Parcel was described 
as connecting the Brown Parcel to 13800 South Street and was adjacent to the Brown Parcel, 
both Sanders and Glanville testified in their depositions that they understood that the Right-
of-Way Parcel was adjacent to and connected to the Brown Parcel. [R 1374-77, 1441-43.] 
When Sanders owned the Brown Parcel (and before he acquired the Panhandle Parcel), he 
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used the right-of-way as his only access to the Brown Parcel. [R. 1080-81, 1438-43.] When 
Sanders read the description of the right-of-way in his real estate contract, he "understood 
that the right-of-way was next to and touched [the Brown Parcel]." [R. 1442-43.] When 
Sanders conveyed the Glanville Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel to Glanville, he provided in 
each of those two deeds that the conveyance was together with and subject to the very same 
metes and bounds description of the right-of-way. [Ex. 8 f25.] Thus, Sanders' position in 
this litigation was directly and irreconcilably contrary to the positions that he took when he, 
himself, owned the Brown Parcel. Browns filed a second motion for summary judgment 
aimed at this issue, and the district court's summary judgment ruled that, based upon the 
undisputed facts, the Right-of-Way Parcel was intended to, and does in fact, touch the Brown 
Parcel. [R. 606-14.] Sanders does not challenge that ruling on appeal. 
Sanders' next group of trespass claims asserted that Browns were improperly using 
the Panhandle Parcel (over which they had a right-of-way) and were through their horses 
trespassing on the Glanville Parcel. Sanders contended that the existence of a driveway 
adjacent to the Browns' garage, which extended into their right-of-way over the Glanville 
Parcel to the extent of approximately 4Vi feet, constituted a trespass. The driveway of which 
Sanders complained was installed before Sanders acquired the Brown Parcel, and Sanders, 
himself, used the driveway in the same manner that he claims is wrongful as to Browns. [R. 
1105-06.] The Panhandle Parcel, because of its narrow width and the right-of-way in favor 
of Browns and Stevenses over it, cannot be used by Sanders for any purpose other than 
access. [R. 1104-05.] Sanders admitted that the existence of the driveway did not in any 
way interfere with his use of the Panhandle Parcel. [R. 1106.] Obviously, as the court 
found, a driveway is a use permitted by an access right-of-way. 
11 
Sanders next complained that Browns' yard grass encroached slightly upon the 
Glanville Parcel. Browns had a right-of-way in this area as well. Browns renewed an area 
of lawn within existing landscaping contours that had existed when they purchased the 
property. [R. 1177-78.] Sanders admitted that Browns merely replaced with lawn the weeds 
that had previously grown into the area. [R. 1116-17.] The existence of the encroaching 
lawn, just as the weeds that existed there previously, did not interfere with Sanders' use of 
the Panhandle Parcel. [R. 1115-16, 1182-83.] Because Sanders complained about the grass, 
Browns removed it. [R. 1116, 1180-81.] 
Sanders also complained that Browns' horses trespassed on the Glanville Parcel. 
During Sanders' ownership of the Brown Parcel, Sanders gave Layne Newman permission to 
run horses on the Glanville Parcel. [R. 1094.] At that time, Newman installed a fence that 
surrounded both the Glanville Parcel and the northerly portion of the Brown Parcel. [R. 
1095.] Sanders gave Newman permission to run his horses there because Sanders wanted the 
horses to control plant growth. Sanders did not limit his permission to horses owned by 
Newman. [R. 1094-95, 1139-41.] When Browns bought the Brown Parcel, the fence was 
still in place and Newman's horses were still there. [R. 1095, 1141-42, 1170-71.] Sanders 
never revoked permission to run horses within that fence until Sanders' attorney sent a letter 
to Browns dated March 2, 1990. [R. 1096.] Within two days after receiving that letter, 
Browns removed their horses and fenced them out of the Glanville Parcel. [R. 1173.J 
Newman's horses occupied the Glanville Parcel for about a year; Browns' horses occupied 
the Glanville Parcel between the fall of 1989 and March 5 or 6, 1990 - about six months. 
[R. 1141, 1170-73.] Sanders cannot say that Browns' horses did any damage to the 
Glanville Parcel. [R. 1098-99.] At trial, he conceded that he claimed no such damage. [R. 
1100.] During his deposition in this case, Browns' counsel told Sanders: 
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Well, let me tell you right now on this record that the Browns want to 
compensate you for any time their horses were on that property fairly. And I 
want you to tell me what it is so I can get you paid. [R. 1416.] 
Browns' counsel specifically asked Sanders to determine a fair rental per month for this 
purpose. Sanders promised to get that information to Browns. [R. 1416-17.] At trial, 
Sanders admitted that he never advised Browns of a fair rent. [R. 1101.] Instead, he went 
to trial and testified that a fair rent was $50 per month [R. 1063] (for a total of about $250). 
Thereafter, but eight months before trial, Browns filed an Offer of Judgment in the amount 
of $750. Sanders never responded. [R. 640.] 
Sanders' Motivation. Sanders' statements and conduct are internally and mutually 
irreconcilable. Sanders admits that Mountainwest had conducted its foreclosure sale and 
Sanders had conveyed the Glanville Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel to Glanville before 
Browns ever appeared on the scene. [R. 1093.] Thus, Sanders had already lost the Brown 
Parcel to foreclosure, Draper City had already granted the variance of which Sanders 
complains, and Sanders had already fraudulently conveyed his remaining properties to 
Glanville before Browns appeared. Sanders had nothing to do with Browns' purchase of the 
Brown Parcel from Mountainwest. [R. 1126-27.] Apart from meeting them at his depo-
sition, Sanders had never met or spoken with Bob and Diane Brown. [R. 1127.] According 
to Sanders, Browns are "nice people" and he has no ill-will towards them. [R. 1240.] 
Amazingly, Sanders admitted that he had not been wronged by the Browns and stated as 
follows: 
The Browns just stumbled into the middle of the case. But the Browns have 
not done anything except they got a piece of property that had problems 
associated with it. And I am attacking the property, not the Browns. [R. 
1251.] 
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Nevertheless, Sanders' Complaints allege that "the actions of Brown . . . have been inten-
tional [and] malicious." [R. 13.] 
Sanders testified that the principal purpose for initiating this action against Browns 
was to rectify the incorrect subdivision of the Brown Parcel from the remaining parcels and 
to correct an alleged unlawful subdivision problem, so that he could sell legal lots. [R. 
1239, 1244-45.] However, nothing in Sanders' Complaint seeks that relief [R. 160], and 
Sanders has never asked Browns to take any action to correct that problem, such as executing 
or recording a document concerning these subjects. [R. 1244-45.] Sanders admits that he 
never asked Browns or Stevenses to do anything to help with the subdivision problem. [R. 
1248.] Sanders' Complaints against Browns ask only for money, even including punitive 
damages. [R. 160, 1245-48.] Sanders never attempted to sell his property or acquire 
governmental approval of the right to build or develop his property; indeed, Draper City has 
advised Sanders that it will issue a building permit with respect to the Glanville Parcel. [R. 
1122-25.] Although Stevenses wanted to buy Sanders' property, Sanders declined. [R. 
1234.] 
The real reason that Sanders initiated this action, as the district court found, was to 
extract from Browns money to which he was not entitled. Sanders is attempting to cover his 
self-inflicted losses from the Mountainwest foreclosure through a bogus action against 
innocent people who did nothing wrong. At trial, Sanders admitted that he filed and pursued 
the lawsuit against Browns, at least in part, "to subject them to intense pressure so that they 
would pay [Sanders] settlement money." [R. 1127-28.] Sanders' Brief concedes this 
testimony, but claims that it was the result of counsel "badgering" Sanders. However, in 
Sanders' deposition, he advanced the same testimony without any prodding: 
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Q Okay. You are indicating that you believe that Mountainwest would 
have done what you wanted it to do, but the Browns won't; is that what 
you are saying? 
A I guess I believe that unless intense pressure is put on the Browns that 
they are not going to make a settlement that I believe would be 
equitable. That's my belief. [R. 1431.] 
After Sanders filed his action, but before any motions for summary judgment were filed, 
Browns' counsel contacted Sanders' counsel and earnestly urged that the case be settled, 
promising that he would do everything in his power to facilitate a settlement based upon any 
reasonable offer. In response, Sanders' counsel sent Browns' counsel a letter dated February 
5, 1991 offering to settle with Browns for the sum of $70,000. [Ex. 15.] To place that 
number in context, Browns paid $100,000 for the entire Brown Parcel with a house located 
on it. [R. 1168-69.] Significantly later, counsel to Sanders and counsel to Browns nego-
tiated a resolution of the case for $7,000. Browns' counsel spent a year going back and forth 
with Sanders' counsel documenting that agreement. Sanders then reneged on that agreement. 
[R. 1209.] After Browns briefed, argued, and prevailed upon two successive motions for 
summary judgment, Sanders offered to settle his remaining trespass claims for between 
$1,000 and $2,500, but in each case insisted on retaining his right to appeal issues then 
previously decided (including the issue whether Browns had access to their property over the 
right-of-way). [R. 1210-12.] 
On November 22, 1994, Browns filed and served in this action a notice of their 
intention to seek an award of attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56. [R. 643.] 
On November 22, 1994 — after the court had entered both summary judgments, but before 
trial, Browns served and filed an Offer of Judgment offering to allow Sanders to take 
judgment against them for $750. [R. 640.] Sanders never responded. 
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This is only one of many (at least four) lawsuits or proceedings that Sanders has filed 
arising from the property at issue here. [R. 1096-97, 1106-08, 1114.] Sanders even 
personally signed a federal RICO complaint, which his attorney declined to execute. [R. 
1249-50.] The trial court found that Sanders "likes to litigate." [R. 1330.] 
Browns' Legal Expenses. Browns incurred in excess of $29,700 in defending 
against the claims of Sanders in this action, of which $6,750 is attributable to time expended 
at trial. The court found those charges to be reasonable under all of the circumstances. [R. 
14, 1196.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Sanders cannot rescind Mountainwest's sale of the Brown Parcel to Browns 
because Sanders is not a party to that transaction and Mountainwest is not a party to this 
case. Sanders' standing for all of his remaining claims requires that he own the Glanville 
and Panhandle Parcels, which the trial court found he did not own. Sanders does not 
challenge that finding. 
Point II. Sanders' claims against Browns that arise from alleged subdivision 
violations were properly dismissed for the following five reasons: (1) Sanders' counsel 
stipulated to the dismissal of his negligence claim. (2) The applicable limitations statute, 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-15 (1953), requires that "any person aggrieved" by a board of 
adjustment decision must file an action challenging the decision within thirty days. Although 
Sanders participated in the board of adjustment proceeding and although he claims to be a 
"person aggrieved," he waited almost two years to challenge the variance. During that time 
span Browns purchased the Brown Parcel, the subdivision of which was validated by the 
variance Sanders now challenges. Sanders cannot now challenge the variance because his 
claim is time barred and to hold otherwise would unfairly prejudice Browns. (3) Ellis v. 
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Hale, 373 P.2d 382 (Utah 1962) squarely holds that no private right of action exists to 
challenge the sale of an improperly subdivided lot. Ellis governs this case and should not be 
overruled. Sanders' claim that Utah Code Ann. §10-9-1002 grants him a private right of 
action is wrong because that statute did not become effective until long after Sanders filed 
this action. (4) Glanville, who owned the Glanville and Panhandle Parcels at all material 
times, had no complaint with Browns or anything they did. Sanders does not challenge this 
finding on appeal. Glanville consented to or acquiesced in Browns' conduct. (5) Browns 
caused Sanders no injury because their involvement with the property followed all events that 
arguably damaged Sanders. The subdivision of which Sanders complains was caused by his 
lender's foreclosure, which resulted from Sanders not making his payments. Sanders' 
damages, if any, were self-inflicted. 
Point III. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that were finally entered by 
the trial court followed three rounds of Sanders' objections, court hearings, and revisions that 
extended over a ten month period. The trial court was actively involved in the formulation 
of the findings. Sanders ignores those findings and instead relies on bits and pieces of the 
court's initial bench ruling to conclude that the court's attorney fee award under Utah Code 
Ann. §78-27-56 was based only on Sanders' trespass claims that were actually tried. The 
trial court's findings, however, were based on Sanders' conduct in initiating and prosecuting 
this entire action, and Sanders does not challenge these findings. They independently sustain 
the court's decision. 
Point IV. If an appellant fails to marshal the evidence in support of and in opposition 
to the court's findings that are challenged, appellate courts refuse to consider the merits of 
challenges to such findings. Sanders has made no reasonable effort to marshal the evidence 
in support of the few findings that he challenges. 
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Point V. The record supports the trial court's legal determination that Sanders' 
claims were without merit and her factual finding that his claims were pursued in bad faith. 
As to the "without merit" conclusion, Sanders's claims were contrary to established law, 
most are ridiculous on their face, one was voluntarily abandoned, and Sanders' and 
Glanville's own testimony and conduct demonstrate that the claims were meritless. Sanders 
does not even challenge most of the trial court's findings supporting his bad faith. Those 
findings are amply supported by Sanders' own testimony and conduct in fraudulently con-
veying property to his relatives to protect his assets, but continuing to claim ownership for 
the purpose of suing Browns, in taking positions totally inconsistent with the positions taken 
by Sanders when he owned the Brown Parcel and otherwise, in making no effort to rectify 
the subdivision problem that he claimed was his focus, in making palpably false allegations, 
and in suing Browns to bring "intense pressure" on them to pay Sanders an obviously 
outrageous sum. By his own admission, Sanders sued Browns for a legally improper 
purpose. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SANDERS LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT ANY CLAIM 
IN THIS ACTION. 
Sanders seeks under his Sixth Cause of Action to rescind Browns' purchase of the 
Brown Parcel from Mountainwest. Obviously, Sanders cannot rescind a transaction to which 
he was not a party, particularly when the other party to the transaction -- Mountainwest — is 
also not a party! If rescission were proper, who is to pay Browns' money back? All of the 
remaining claims asserted in this action by Sanders against Browns (and, for that matter, 
against Draper City) require that Sanders own the Glanville Parcel and/or the Panhandle 
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Parcel. If Sanders owned no interest in those parcels, which adjoin the Brown Parcel, he 
obviously cannot be injured by any subdivision, use, trespass, or other activity on or related 
to the Brown Parcel. 
The trial court concluded as a matter of fact and law that Glanville was the owner of 
the Glanville Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel at all material times, that Sanders had no 
interest in that land, and that, in any event, because Sanders conveyed to Glanville that land 
to place it beyond the reach of his creditors, he was estopped to assert that he has any 
ownership in the property. [R. 901, 908.] Sanders challenges none of these findings or 
conclusions on appeal. Based upon those findings and conclusions, Sanders is a complete 
stranger to all affected property and this entire controversy. It necessarily follows that 
Sanders cannot have been damaged by anything Browns did or did not do, and Sanders has 
no standing to advance any of the claims that he has made.3 
POINT II 
NEITHER SANDERS NOR GLANVILLE CAN MAINTAIN 
CLAIMS AGAINST BROWNS ARISING FROM VIOLA-
TIONS OF UTAH'S SUBDIVISION LAWS. 
The trial court's Summary Judgment dismissing subdivision-related claims can be 
sustained on the following five independent grounds: 
Sanders Stipulated to the Dismissal of Fifth Cause of Action. At the hearing of 
Browns' first motion for summary judgment, Sanders' then-counsel stipulated to the dismissal 
As to the trespass claims, a plaintiff must show ownership of or the right to exclusive possession of 
the property in question. E.g., Wood v. Mvrup. 681 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1984). Sanders' "private nuisance" 
claim under Seventh Cause of Action [R. 158-59] is based on Utah Code Ann. §78-38-1, which was recently 
amended. As to this claim under the version of Utah Code Ann. §78-38-1 that applies to this action, only a 
person "whose property is injuriously affected . . . may bring an action." As to Sanders' illegal subdivision 
claims under Utah Code Ann. §10-9-1002, he must show that he is an "owner of real estate within the 
municipality." 
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of Fifth Cause of Action of the Amended Complaint [R. 157], which alleged that Browns' 
negligent purchase of the Brown Parcel from Mountainwest somehow damaged Sanders4: 
[Mr. Lee, Brown's Co-Counsel]: Our final argument is that plaintiffs' 
negligence claim falls for an additional reason, and that is that plaintiffs have 
not and cannot assert two of the essential elements of negligence under Utah 
law. They can't establish any duty running to plaintiffs and they can't estab-
lish any injury resulting from defendants' conduct. 
Mr. Green [Sanders' then-counsel]: We concede the negligence cause 
of action should be dismissed. 
The Court: All right. Thank you, Mr. Green. 
Mr. Lee: Thank you. 
[R. 961-62.] An attorney's stipulations and agreements are binding on his or her client. 
State, in the interest of Davis. 28 Utah 2d 428, 503 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1972). 
Plaintiffs' Claims are Barred by the Statute of Limitations. Utah Code Ann. 
§10-9-15 (1953), the statute applicable to Sanders' claims at the time the causes of action 
arose,5 provides as follows: 
The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of 
adjustment may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any 
court of competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is presented 
to the court within thirty days after filing of such decision in the office of the 
board. 
Although Sanders participated in and opposed the variance proceeding about which he now 
complains, he took no judicial action to challenge that variance for about two years - long 
after the expiration of the thirty day limitation period. 
Sanders' negligence claim was based in part on his unlawful subdivision theory. It incorporated by 
reference the subdivision allegations, and specifically mentioned the variance as a basis for this claim. [R. 157.] 
See also Sanders' Brief at pp. 2-3. 
5
 Sanders incorrectly asserts that Utah Code Ann. §§10-9-1001 and 1002 apply here. These statutes 
were enacted in 1991, whereas the events giving rise to this action occurred in 1988 and Sanders filed his action 
in April of 1990. Those provisions are, therefore, inapplicable to this appeal. 
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To avoid this obvious bar to his claim, Sanders advances three arguments. First, he 
argues that this limitations period does not apply to "claims that Brown continues to occupy 
his property in violation of existing subdivision laws, even assuming the validity of the 1988 
variance." The short answer to that contention is that the 1988 variance validates the com-
pliance of the Brown Parcel with existing subdivision laws. [Ex. 4.] Sanders then argues 
that "Brown's failure to comply with the variance" is not foreclosed by the statute. [Brief at 
21.] However, the court at trial determined that, according to Draper City, the Brown house 
is presently a valid nonconforming previously existing use and does not violate the variance 
issued by Draper during 1988. [R. 904, 910.] The Draper City official charged with 
enforcing the variance so testified at trial. [R. 1216-18; Ex. 9.] Sanders does not appeal 
from these determinations. 
Second, Sanders claims that the thirty day period does not apply to Sanders' claims 
against the City. Browns here incorporate by reference the portion of the Brief of Draper 
City that is addressed to this issue. 
Finally, Sanders argues that the limitations period does not apply to Sanders' direct 
claims against Browns because it applies only to claims seeking review of decisions of the 
Board of Adjustment. The 1988 variance was granted after a hearing attended by Sanders 
and was not timely challenged by Sanders. Section 10-9-15 requires that Sanders, as "any 
person aggrieved," initiate a plenary action for relief within thirty days. He did not. If 
Sanders is a "person aggrieved," he is bound by that limitations period.6 If he is not a 
"person aggrieved," then he has no claim for redress based on the variance. Sanders is 
6
 In a closely analogous context involving limitations and land use planning, the Supreme Court held 
that whether or not one is a party to the challenged land use proceeding, one is a "person aggrieved" if he or she 
is adversely affected by the challenged decision. Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 15 Utah 2d 305, 392 P.2d 
40 (Utah 1964). Sanders' pleadings clearly allege that he was so adversely affected. 
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therefore precluded from challenging the validity of the variance, and the variance validates 
Browns' occupation of the Brown Parcel. 
This short limitations period serves the vital purpose of assuring "the expeditious and 
orderly development of a community." Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 15 Utah 2d 305, 
392 P.2d 40, 42 (Utah 1964). It ensures that after the 30 days have expired, the local 
decision is final and development may proceed without the risk that an action such as this 
one will undercut the settled expectations of the parties. This case is a fine example of why 
the limitations period should bar Sanders' claims against Browns. Sanders, by not chal-
lenging the variance for two years, failed to exercise diligence in asserting any violation of 
the subdivision ordinances. During the period of Sanders' delay, Browns innocently pur-
chased the affected property. Allowing Sanders' claims would substantially prejudice the 
reasonable expectations of Browns. 
Plaintiffs Cannot Maintain a Private Action to Challenge the Sale of a Sub-
division Lot Under Zoning and Planning Laws. The trial court correctly followed Ellis v. 
Hale, 373 P.2d 382 (Utah 1962), which holds that there is no private right of action to 
challenge the sale of a subdivision lot under zoning and planning laws. Sanders first 
incorrectly argues that Ellis v. Hale is invalidated by Utah Code Ann. §10-9-1002, which 
does not apply to this case because it became effective after plaintiffs' causes of action 
accrued and after the filing of this action. See footnote 5 at page 20 above. Ellis v. Hale 
was decided at a time when the statute applicable to this case, Utah Code Ann. §10-9-30, 
was in effect. Ellis v. Hale clearly precludes a private action like the one brought here. 
Ellis v. Hale specifically held that there is no private right of action against a defendant 
alleged to have sold an unlawfully subdivided lot. Just as plaintiffs argue here, the plaintiff 
in Ellis argued that the defendants violated the law by selling a lot where the subdivision had 
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not been properly approved. The court reasoned that the subdivision laws "were not enacud 
to promote safety, and they do not attempt to lay down rules regulating the conduct of 
individuals inter se." 373 P.2d at 384. Accordingly, the court held that the sole remedy for 
a sale of an unlawfully subdivided lot is the imposition of a criminal sanction. The duty to 
enforce these laws runs "to the Sovereign" and a violation thereof does not give rise to civil 
liability. Thus, consistent with Ellis, the Draper ordinances provide a criminal sanction that 
is to be enforced by the Sovereign, and do not create any private right of action.7 In this 
case, it is undisputed that the Sovereign has chosen to approve the subdivision challenged by 
plaintiffs. 
Sanders next argues that Ellis v. Hale should be overruled. This Court should not 
accept that invitation because Sanders never raised this argument below. [R. 276.] This 
case, like Ellis, is governed by Utah Code Ann. §10-9-30. That statute has now been 
replaced by Utah Code Ann. §10-9-1002, which does not govern this case. If Ellis is to be 
revisited, it should be revisited in its application to the statute of current relevance, which 
cannot be done here. Finally, the Ellis court's logic and analysis were and are sound. The 
rule urged by Sanders would undermine municipalities' control over land use planning, 
would allow private parties to initiate litigation whenever they disagree with municipalities' 
enforcement decisions, and would render Judges ex officio members of planning and zoning 
boards. 
Draper City ordinances support this conclusion. The Draper ordinances provide that a violation of 
the land use and development regulations constitutes a "Class 'B' misdemeanor . . . punishable by a fine of not 
more than $1,000.00, or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment 
for each infraction." [Section 9-2-17.] The City has the duty to "commence action or proceedings for the 
abatement and removal" of land uses violative of development regulations. [Section 9-2-3(b).] The ordinances 
assign the duty of enforcing such provisions to the "Building Official/Zoning Administrator," and charge that 
officer with "entering actions in the regulatory board, commissions or courts when necessary. . . . " [Section 
9-2-4.] No private right of action is authorized. These ordinances are included as item 5 of the Appendix. 
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Glanville Did Not Complain of Browns. The trial court found that Glanville, not 
Sanders, owned the Glanville Parcel and Panhandle Parcel at all material times. [R. 901, 
908.] The trial court also found that Glanville had no complaint with Browns or anything 
they did. [R. 902, 905, 908.] Sanders challenges neither finding on this appeal. It follows 
that whatever Browns did, Glanville either acquiesced in it, consented to it, and/or waived 
any claim arising from it. E.g.. Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah 1975) 
[acquiescence in conduct precludes claims based upon it]; K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 
623 (Utah 1994) [waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right]; Scott v. Jordan, 
99 N.M. 567, 661 P.2d 59, 63-64 (N.M. App. 1983) [knowledge of facts giving rise to 
claims and inaction acts as estoppel]. 
Plaintiffs Have Shown no Injury From Browns' Claimed Violation of Subdivision 
Ordinances. Here, it must be remembered that Browns purchased the Brown Parcel in 
1989 — long after Sanders' predecessors granted the trust deed to Mountainwest covering the 
Brown Parcel and the right-of-way in 1980, after Mountainwest secured Draper City's 
variance validating the separate Brown Parcel in July 1988, and after Mountainwest's 
foreclosure of its trust deed and purchase of the property at a trustee's sale in September 
1988. Browns could not, therefore, have been a cause of any damage to plaintiffs flowing 
from subdivision issues. Browns' motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss 
plaintiffs' unlawful subdivision claims was based on this reason as well. [R. 199-200.] The 
trial court granted the motion upon the grounds stated in Browns' memorandum. [R. 311.] 
Plaintiffs, however, did not contest this reason before the trial court [R. 272-77, 298-99] and 
therefore are precluded from raising this issue on appeal.8 A corollary of the foregoing is 
Sanders' brief does not assail this ground for the trial court's Partial Summary Judgment. 
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that the rescission claim asserted against Browns in Sixth Cause of Action of the Amended 
Complaint [R. 158] must fail. The cause of the "subdivision" of the Brown Parcel from the 
adjacent Glanville and Panhandle Parcels occurred when Nipkos gave Mountainwest its trust 
deed in 1980. Sanders thereafter bought the Brown Parcel, assumed that trust deed, and 
defaulted under it. The resulting foreclosure during 1988 severed the Brown Parcel from 
adjacent land. Browns' purchase from Mountainwest did not cause the subdivision to 
occur — Sanders' failure to pay his lender was the cause. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE IGNORED GROUNDS FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT'S RULING UNDER SECTION 78-27-56. 
In challenging the trial court's award to Browns of legal fees under Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-56, Sanders mischaracterizes the basis for the trial court's decision. Sanders' Brief 
incorrectly suggests that the trial court's ruling was based only on Sanders' improperly taking 
his trespass claims to trial. In fact, the trial court found that Sanders initiated and prosecuted 
all of his unmeritorious claims in bad faith. A little procedural history is necessary here. 
In announcing her decision from the bench, the trial court observed that Sanders made 
no effort to pursue his claimed desire to make his property marketable in five years of 
litigation; he made no effort to resolve his problems with Stevenses and Browns; he "likes to 
litigate;" and he made "no effort" to resolve this case. [R. 1329-30.] At the court's 
direction, Browns' counsel on August 25, 1995 submitted proposed findings and conclusions 
to counsel for approval or comment. [R. 804-820.] On September 1, 1995, Sanders sub-
mitted objections to those findings. [R. 784.] Sanders specifically requested that the court 
limit its bad faith findings to the trespass claims that were tried and Sanders' refusal to settle. 
[R. 786 114-6; R. 787 117-9.] Sanders specifically objected to paragraphs 7-18 of the 
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findings, which detailed the basis for the court's findings that all of Sanders' claims were 
unmeritorious and advanced in bad faith. [R. 786 [^4.] Sanders objected to pa.agraph 19 of 
the proposed findings, which stated that M[t]he claims asserted by Sanders in the action have 
no basis in law or fact." [R. 786 f5; R. 815 [^19.] Instead, Sanders requested that this 
finding be limited to trespass and Sanders' lack of standing. [R. 786 ^5.] The court ordered 
the parties between themselves further to attempt to resolve disputes concerning the findings. 
[R. 802.] 
After counsels' further discussions, revised proposed findings were served on 
Sanders' counsel on October 20, 1995. [R. 845-61.] Sanders filed revised objections to 
those findings on October 30, 1995, in which he renewed substantially all of the objections 
noted above. [R. 820.] Browns filed a response to that objection on November 3, 1995. 
[R. 832.] A second hearing concerning Sanders' objections occurred on December 6, 1995. 
[R. 844.] The court made various rulings and ordered Browns' counsel to prepare a second 
revised set of proposed findings incorporating those rulings. [R. 844.] On December 11, 
1995, Browns' counsel submitted those second revised findings to the court and counsel, 
along with a letter summarizing the court's ruling. [R. 872.] The trial court overruled 
Sanders' objections to the findings and conclusions that are relevant here, and indeed 
requested that some findings be amplified. [R. 872-74.] The trial court also requested and 
received a transcript of her bench ruling. [R. 874.] Sanders filed his third set of objections 
on December 18, 1995. [R. 875.] Browns filed their third response on December 29, 1995. 
[R. 881.] On June 28, 1996, the trial court by Minute Entry ruled on all of Sanders' latest 
objections. [R. 891.] The trial court, for the third time considering Sanders' objections to 
the findings, overruled with comment all of Sanders' remaining objections. Also on June 28, 
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1996, the trial court entered the Evidentiary Ruling, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of 
Law that are before this Court on appeal. [R. 894.] 
The foregoing history is included to dispel any suggestion that the trial court did not 
really mean to find as it did or that the findings prepared by Browns' counsel did not 
correctly express the court's ruling.9 
In contrast, Sanders' brief at pages 23-29 ignores these findings and conclusions as to 
all claims save the trespass claims that were tried and attacks only the court's ruling that 
these trespass claims were improperly pursued. Sanders does not challenge the court's other 
bases for its award of legal fees to Browns ~ Sanders' frivolous claims that were resolved 
through two summary judgment proceedings. The statement of fact section of this brief, 
along with Points I and II above, demonstrate that these claims were meritless and pursued in 
bad faith. Because Sanders has not even challenged10 these independent bases for the court's 
decision, the trial court's judgment must be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVI-
DENCE CONCERNING THEIR CHALLENGES TO THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
When an appellant assails the sufficiency of evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings of fact, it has the burden of marshaling all of the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings and then demonstrating that the findings are so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence. E.g., Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 
9
 Under these circumstances, the court's findings are entitled to substantial deference. Bover Co. v. 
Lignell. 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977); Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1993). 
10
 In addition to his failure to challenge these grounds, Sanders necessarily also failed to marshal the 
evidence concerning the court's relevant factual determinations. This is yet another reason why Sanders' appeal 
from the Section 78-27-56 ruling must be rejected. See Point IV below. 
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1286-87 (Utah 1993); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). 
When an appellant fails to carry its burden of marshaling the evidence, the appellate courts 
have refused to consider the merits of challenges to findings and have accepted the findings 
as valid. Id.; Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987). 
Here, as will be demonstrated, plaintiffs have made no reasonable effort to marshal 
the findings of the trial court in support of and in opposition to its findings that all of the 
claims of Sanders were not brought or asserted in good faith under Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-56. Because Sanders has failed in that indisputable obligation, the trial court's 
findings in this regard must be affirmed. In the point that follows, Browns will demonstrate 
that the court's findings are abundantly supported by the record in any event. 
POINT V 
THE COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT SANDERS' 
CLAIMS WERE WITHOUT MERIT AND WERE NOT 
BROUGHT OR ASSERTED IN GOOD FAITH ARE SUP-
PORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, if a court finds both that the action is without 
merit and was not brought or asserted in good faith, the court has no discretion and must 
award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party. Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & 
Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). The trial court made each finding requisite to an award of 
attorney's fees under this section. [R. 905-07, 910.] 
Sanders' Claims Were Without Merit, To establish the "without merit" require-
ment of the statute, the action must have no basis in law or fact. E.g., Cady v. Johnson, 
671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah App. 1991). The court 
concluded that "[t]his action is without merit and was not brought or asserted in good faith 
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within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56." [R. 910.] That legal conclusion was 
based upon extensive findings of fact, none of which are specifically challenged by Sanders. 
Sanders asserted four claims against Browns. Each was dismissed on the merits 
either on motion for summary judgment or after trial. The frivolous nature of each will be 
addressed in turn. 
Fourth Cause of Action concerned trespass over the alleged gap between the Brown 
Parcel and the Right-of-Way Parcel as well as claims that driveways, grass, and horses 
encroached on Sanders' land. Those claims were first frivolous because Sanders did not own 
the Glanville and Panhandle Parcels. Contrary to Sanders' claim that Browns "never 
challenged Sanders' standing to assert the claims until the time of trial" [Brief at 24], that 
very defense appears in Browns' Answers. [R. 81, 167.] Sanders does not challenge any of 
the court's findings, which demonstrate that even assuming he had standing, Sanders wholly 
failed to demonstrate any trespass. [Findings 119-18; R. 902-05.] Sanders inconsistently 
complained of Browns' "trespass" behavior, when Sanders himself admitted having acted in 
just the same manner during his separate ownership of the Brown Parcel. [Findings 1f 12, 
20, 24; R. 903-07.] Sanders alleged that the right-of-way did not furnish access to the 
Brown Parcel, but admitted that he thought otherwise. 
Fifth Cause of Action alleged that Browns' "negligent" purchase of the Brown Parcel 
from Mountainwest gave him some claim. Sanders' attorney abandoned that claim at the 
hearing of Browns' motion to dismiss it. This claim was and is frivolous for several obvious 
reasons: Browns' purchase obviously could not have been a cause in fact of Sanders' 
injury - Sanders had already been foreclosed out of his property because he didn't pay his 
mortgage. Browns obviously owed no duty to Sanders, with whom they had no dealings or 
contact. 
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Sixth Cause of Action alleged that Browns' purchase from Mountainwest violated the 
subdivision laws and should be rescinded. That claim is frivolous because squarely gov-
erning law, Ellis v. Hale, 373 P.2d 382 (Utah 1962), bars any such private right of action. 
It is also frivo!' us because Sanders obviously has no standing to rescind a transaction to 
which he is not a party. It is also frivolous because even if rescission were available, 
Mountainwest was obviously an indispensable but unjoined party. Further, Sanders, who 
actively opposed the variance validating the subdivision, never timely challenged it. He 
allowed it to become final and unappealable — then he ignored it. 
Seventh Cause of Action seeks recovery based on "private nuisance" under Utah Code 
Ann. §78-38-1. It is frivolous because, like Sixth Cause, it ignores the Ellis v. Hale rule 
and it ignores the validating variance that Sanders actively opposed and then failed timely to 
appeal. Even if the subdivision were invalid, the version of Section 78-38-1 then in effect 
defines "nuisance" as "[ajnything which is injurious to health, or indecent, or offensive to the 
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable 
enjoyment of life or property." A violation of subdivision laws is not even arguably within 
that definition. Finally, Section 78-38-1 only allows those "whose property is injuriously 
affected" to sue. Sanders did not own any such property. 
Sanders attempts to circumvent his lack of ownership (which is only one of the many 
reasons why his claims are frivolous) through reliance on the Assignment purportedly 
executed by Margaret Glanville. [Ex. 1.] First, that document was determined to be 
inadmissible, and Sanders does not challenge that ruling. Sanders does not logically explain 
how this Court can consider that document, which Sanders now concedes is inadmissible. 
Second, any claim that the Assignment should have been admissible is also frivolous for the 
ten reasons set forth in the trial court's Evidentiary Ruling. [R. 895-97.] Third, the 
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Assignment could only have transferred Glanville's claims, and Glanville testified that he had 
no complaint with Browns. 
Sanders' Claims Were Not Asserted in Good Faith. "[A] lack of good faith turns 
on subjective intent." Chipman v. Miller, 312 Utah. Adv. Rptr. 37, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). The absence of good faith can be demonstrated by a showing that plaintiff intended 
to hinder, delay, or take advantage of another. Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983). 
"A finding of bad faith is a question of fact and is reviewed by this court under the 'clearly 
erroneous' standard." Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The trial court in paragraphs 19 through 25 of its Findings of Fact [R. 905-07] 
detailed the facts showing that Sanders acted in bad faith. Sanders' Brief does not even 
mention, much less marshal the evidence as to, those findings. Sanders must show that "the 
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court, is legally insufficient to support 
the contested finding." Utah Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). This he cannot do. 
After conveying away the Glanville Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel to place them 
beyond the reach of his creditors, Sanders nevertheless took the position that he continued to 
own those parcels for the purpose of harassing Browns with this lawsuit. Sanders' con-
current positions that his creditors could not reach these assets, but Sanders could continue to 
claim ownership to sue Browns, is itself an act of bad faith. 
The court found that Sanders' claims in this action were "completely inconsistent with 
and contradictory to his own statements and actions during his ownership of the Brown 
Parcel." [R. 905.] Sanders admits that he occupied and used the Brown Parcel (before he 
acquired the Glanville Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel) exactly as the Browns did. In this 
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action, he asserts that the Browns, by acting as he did, acted improperly and actionably. 
Sanders admits that at the time he acquired the Brown Parcel with its appurtenant right-of-
way, he understood and believed that the right-of-way was adjacent to the Brown Parcel. 
However, after the Browns bought the same property, Sanders sued them claiming that the 
right-of-way was not adjacent to the Brown Parcel. During his independent ownership of the 
Brown Parcel, Sanders used his driveway, parked cars, contoured landscape, and otherwise 
acted with respect to the Brown Parcel just as the Browns did. However, after Sanders was 
foreclosed out, he sued the Browns claiming that their acting as he had acted constituted a 
violation of his rights. Sanders admitted that none of the Browns' activities in any way 
interfered with Sanders' use of his property. With respect to the horse trespass issue, 
Sanders gave Newman permission to run horses on the Glanville Parcel. Indeed, Sanders 
desired that horses run there to keep the foliage eaten down. Nevertheless, after 
Mountainwest foreclosed Sanders out, with no prior communication, he had his attorney 
demand that Browns remove their horses from Newman's pen, which Browns did within one 
to two days after the request. Nevertheless, shortly thereafter Sanders sued Browns for this 
claimed trespass. During Sanders' deposition, Browns' counsel asked Sanders to come up 
with a fair rental for the Browns' horses' occupation, promising that Browns would pay that 
fair rent to Sanders. In the two and one-half years that followed prior to trial, Sanders never 
advised Browns of a fair rental amount as he promised he would. 
The point of the foregoing is that, from a factual standpoint, Sanders in this action 
took positions that are irreconcilably inconsistent with the positions that he took when he 
owned the Brown Parcel. Sanders' legal positions were also inconsistent. He asserted that 
the Brown Parcel (which he, himself, owned and occupied separately) violated zoning 
ordinances that should be enforced against the Browns. He asserted that the right-of-way 
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that he used to access the Brown Parcel during his separate ownership of it was located in 
such a way as not to furnish access for the Browns. He asserted that Browns' purchase of 
the property from Mountainwest, Sanders' foreclosing lender, violated his rights. He 
asserted that Mountainwest's sale of the property to Browns (a transaction to which he was 
not a party) was illegal and should be rescinded. He asserted that the Browns' very 
occupation of the same property that he, himself, had previously occupied separately 
constituted a "private nuisance." 
Sanders admits that Browns had nothing to do with the subdivision problem that 
preoccupies him and that he never met or communicated with them before suing them. They 
appeared on the scene only after the subdivision occurred, after the variance validating it was 
allowed, after Sanders had been foreclosed out of the Brown Parcel, and indeed after Sanders 
had conveyed his contiguous property to his relatives. Sanders even admitted that he had not 
been wronged by the Browns. Sanders testified that his purpose in litigating was to rectify 
his subdivision problem and make his property saleable as a legal lot, but Sanders made 
absolutely no effort to accomplish those goals. Instead, Sanders sued Browns for money and 
even sought punitive damages based upon the patently false claim that Browns' acts were 
intentional and malicious. 
The trial court found that Sanders filed and prosecuted this action to hinder, bother, 
harass and take advantage of Browns and to coerce them into paying Sanders large amounts 
of money in settlement. That finding is supported by an examination of Sanders' claims 
themselves as well as Sanders' own trial and deposition testimony that he filed suit to bring 
"intense pressure" to bear on Browns to pay settlement money. [R. 1127-28, 1431.] 
Consistently, Sanders' wild settlement demand was for $70,000 — 70% of what Browns paid 
for their house and property. Later on in the case, Sanders agreed to a settlement with 
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Browns for $7,000, but after a year of Browns' attempting to document the settlement 
transaction, Sanders reneged. Even though Browns moved their lawn, moved their horses 
and offered to pay Sanders fair rent for any claimed trespass, Sanders would have none of it. 
He barreled ahead with his litigation. Sanders forced Browns to litigate for seven years and 
to spend tens of thousands in defense costs concerning claims that were economically 
minuscule (even assuming they were meritorious and accepting Sanders' own version of their 
value). Sanders would never agree to settle the case with Browns without preserving his 
right to appeal the frivolous claim that Browns lacked access to their property, which had 
already been decided on motion against Sanders. Sanders used this litigation as a club with 
which he attempted to bludgeon Browns into paying large amounts for baseless claims. 
Sanders admits to having filed as many as four lawsuits involving this same property — 
including a federal RICO action that Sanders signed himself because his attorney declined. 
As the trial court observed, "Mr. Sanders is someone who likes to litigate." [R. 
1330.] Here he filed baseless claims and stubbornly pursued them in bad faith, thereby 
hurting some nice people who did nothing wrong. Browns' legal expenses now approach 
half of the purchase price of Browns' house. Section 78-27-56 is aimed at precisely the kind 
of abuse that Sanders has perpetrated here. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court found, as a matter of fact, that Sanders owned no interest in any of the 
real property that is the subject of this action. That factual determination has not been 
challenged by Sanders in this appeal. Sanders' lack of any ownership in any relevant 
property is fatal to each and every claim that he asserts against Browns. 
The district court's first summary judgment against Sanders, which dismissed 
Sanders' claims of illegality, private nuisance, and negligence, was correct and can be 
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sustained on these grounds: (i) Sanders stipulated to dismiss his negligence claim; (ii) the 
limitations period expired for any challenge to the variance validating the subdivision; (iii) 
even if Sanders owned adjacent property, private parties have no standing to enforce 
Draper's planning and zoning ordinances; (iv) Glanville, the owner of the adjacent property, 
had no complaint with Browns' conduct; and (v) Sanders showed no injury from Browns' 
alleged subdivision problem. 
This is a clear case for application of Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56. Sanders does not 
even challenge most of the trial court's findings; as to those that he does challenge, he 
ignores his duty to marshal the evidence. A mountain of evidence establishes Sanders' bad 
faith. Sanders' initiation and stubborn pursuit of his frivolous claims have been characterized 
by evident bad faith and have subjected innocent people to a legal expense that itself is 
punitive and disproportionate to the character of the dispute. 
The trial court's Final Judgment dismissing with prejudice all of plaintiffs' claims 
against Browns should be affirmed, Browns should be awarded their costs on appeal, and, 
pursuant to paragraph 16 of the trial court's Conclusions of Law [R. 910], this Court should 
remand this case for a determination of the amount of additional attorney's fees incurred on 
appeal to be awarded to Browns. 
ADDENDUM 
There is no Addendum to this brief because no Addendum is necessary and Browns 
rely upon the Addendum of plaintiffs/appellants. 
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